Identifying which subjects are vulnerable, and implementing safeguards to protect them, is widely regarded as essential to clinical research. Commentators have endorsed a number of responses to these challenges and have thereby made significant progress in understanding vulnerability in clinical research. At the same time, this literature points to a central contradiction which calls into question its potential to protect vulnerable subjects in practice. Specifically, analysis suggests that all human subjects are vulnerable and vulnerability in clinical research is comparative and context dependent, in the sense that individuals are vulnerable relative to others and in some contexts only.
list of vulnerable subjects seems to imply that individuals who receive welfare benefits are uniformly incapable of making decisions for themselves.
Commentators have attempted to address these concerns by endorsing comparative or context dependent analyses of vulnerability.
For example, New Zealand guidelines on observational studies note that vulnerability is a broad category that covers many groups, including people who speak a different language or have a different cultural background from the investigators. 7 The guidelines go on to address the potential for over-inclusiveness by pointing out that 'even if a group is identified as being likely to be vulnerable, the label may not apply to all individuals in such groups, and even where it does apply, it may do so only intermittently.' 8 While this approach may help to address the potential to stigmatize individuals within the cited groups, it leaves investigators and review committees with the initial challenge that analyses of vulnerability are supposed to address: which individuals within the cited groups are vulnerable and when do they need additional protections? The present article attempts to identify the sources of this persisting confusion and potential solutions to it, beginning with an overview of extant analyses.
Analyses of vulnerability in clinical research attempt to address three primary questions. 9 First, the concept of vulnerability itself: what does it mean for an individual or group to be vulnerable? Second, analyses attempt to determine which individuals or groups are vulnera- This approach has the potential to succeed only if the significance of claims regarding vulnerability remains constant across the three domains. Against this, a pragmatic analysis suggests that the practical significance of claims regarding vulnerability is not determined strictly by the meaning of the claims, but depends on the context in which they are used. Hence, analysis of the meaning of vulnerability will not identify which subjects are vulnerable. Moreover, since the practical significance of claims regarding vulnerability can vary by context, identifying which subjects are vulnerable will not be sufficient to identify what steps are needed to protect them. A pragmatic analysis thus has the potential to resolve the central contradiction that arises from a combination of the claims that vulnerability applies to everyone and that it applies only to those who are especially vulnerable or vulnerable in certain contexts. 10 What appears to be a contradiction involves different uses or senses of vulnerability.
| EXISTING ACC OUNT S
Scholarship on the concept of vulnerability in clinical research has been significantly influenced by the US regulations, 11 and by the recommendations of the National Commission on which the US regulations are based. 12 The National Commission was formed in response to condemnation of the Tuskegee syphilis study and was charged with identifying ways to protect the subjects of clinical research. 13 The Commission argued that independent review and respect for the capacity of competent adults to make their own decisions represent the fundamental protections for research subjects. On the assumption that independent review is possible for all relevant studies, this analysis suggests that National Ethics Advisory Committee. (2012) . Ethical guidelines for observational studies: Observational research, audits and related activities. Revised edition. Wellington, NZ: Retrieved from https://neac.health.govt.nz/system/ files/documents/publications/ethical-guidelines-for-observational-studies-2012.pdf 8 Ibid., 26.
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For a variation on this typology, which identifies four questions that need to be addressed by a general analysis of the ethics of vulnerability, see: Mackenzie, C., Rogers, W., & Dodds. S. (2014) . Introduction: What is vulnerability, and why does it matter for moral theory? In C. Mackenzie, W. Rogers, & S. Dodds (Eds.), Vulnerability: New essays in ethics and feminist philosophy (pp. 1-29 vulnerable subjects are those who are not able to consent for themselves. This conclusion led the Commission to propose additional protections for four groups: pregnant women/fetuses/neonates, prisoners, children, and the mentally infirm. The first three sets of recommendations were eventually incorporated into US regulations, with some modifications, while the proposed additional protections for the mentally infirm were rejected out of concern that they might block valuable and appropriate research.
14 Subsequent efforts endorsed the Commission's approach of identifying subjects for whom the requirements of independent review and informed consent were not sufficient and then proposed additions to the list. The Belmont report adds racial minorities, the economically disadvantaged, and the very sick. 15 The final US regulations mention subjects who are 'likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence,'
including mentally disabled persons and economically or educationally disadvantaged persons. Another account argues that concern should focus on research subjects who are at risk of not being treated equally, 16 while still other accounts combine several of these and other elements. 17 The legacy of these incremental and well-intended additions has been confusion over what to do in the face of an everexpanding universe of vulnerable subjects. independent of what explains their relative lack of capacity. Yet this approach still seems too broad and too narrow.
It is too broad because some harms are not relevant to vulnerability in research, even though they may occur in the research setting.
We saw this previously with respect to the fact that individuals with limited work flexibility can be at greater risk of economic harm as a result of their participation in research. Nonetheless, these individuals do not constitute a vulnerable group of research subjects. The potential for this approach to be overly narrow can be traced back to the fact that some, although not all, of its proponents focus on harms to subject welfare, thus ignoring the possibility that subjects may be vulnerable in virtue of being at increased risk of not being treated with respect. Recognizing the importance of respect, some wrongs that might occur as a result of one's participation in research do not seem relevant to research vulnerability, suggesting that this account is too broad as well. Consider an investigator who occasionally has lunch with her subjects in the cafeteria. Both buy for themselves and they sit together.
Imagine that the investigator arranges these meetings in advance and agrees to meet the subjects. The investigator thereby makes a commitment to the individuals and acts wrongly if she fails to show up (without sufficient justification). Now imagine that this investigator implements the research regulations scrupulously for all groups, but she is more inclined to break these lunch dates with respect to a particular group. It follows that these individuals are at identifiably increased likelihood of incurring additional wrong compared to other individuals who enroll in her trials. Still it seems mistaken to say that, as research subjects, these individuals are vulnerable. The explanation seems to be that, as with potential harms, research regulations are not designed to protect subjects from all possible wrongs. Hence, being at increased risk of being wronged does not necessarily make one vulnerable; it depends on the potential wrong in question.
By defining vulnerability in terms of wrongs, this account also seems too narrow. It misses sources of vulnerability that trace to the potential for increased harm rather than increased wrong. For example, young children are vulnerable because they are not able to understand important aspects of clinical trials. It is for this reason that children need special protections. Of course, investigators may fail to recognize children's vulnerability and they may thereby fail to implement the additional protections called for by children's lack of capacity. And this may result in the children being wronged. Yet, the obligations of investigators to protect children are not the source of their vulnerability.
Instead, these obligations arise from the fact that children are unable to understand the research in question. If all investigators faithfully enact the additional protections for children, it would follow that pediatric subjects are not at increased risk of being wronged. Nonetheless, additional protections would still be needed because children are vulnerable.
More recent commentators argue that definitional approaches to vulnerability fail because they fail to recognize that vulnerability depends on the context: 'An individual's needs for special protections in the research context may depend more on personal factors, characteristics of the research and the research environment, available alternatives, and other factors than merely on that person's inclusion in a particular sociodemographic group.' 28 Whether women are vulnerable depends on whether they live in a society which respects them.
29
Whether individuals who work in a research lab are vulnerable depends on who has authority over the study. One proposed explanation for this context dependence cites the claim that vulnerability is essentially relational. A research subject is vulnerable to a researcher, and the fact of their vulnerability implies obligations on the researcher to protect them.
30
The claim that vulnerability in clinical research is context dependent provides a crucial component of an overall account and helps to explain the fact that many analyses are both helpful and too broad.
They are helpful to the extent that they identify individuals and groups that are vulnerable. But, they become too broad and vulnerable themselves to counterexamples when they suggest that the cited individuals are vulnerable in all cases. This implication also raises the potential mentioned at the outset for lists of vulnerable subjects to become stigmatizing.
The fact that a context dependent analysis has these virtues may lead one to conclude that the prior conclusion-all human beings are vulnerable-must be mistaken. Yet, it seems undeniable that, in some sense at least, all human beings are vulnerable. Our bodies, our hopes, our relationships, our projects, are all under threat from others and the environment. Indeed, it has been argued that developing adequate protections for human subjects depends on recognizing that all subjects are vulnerable. The author argues that contextual accounts ignore this critical aspect of vulnerability and goes on to express surprise that it has 'taken so long to recognize this to be the case.' 31 This seems both clearly right and fundamentally problematic. All human beings can be harmed. But regarding all humans as vulnerable seems to undermine rather than promote appropriate protections for research subjects.
To consider one final account, it has been argued that the solution to all of this confusion lies in more extensive conceptual analysis.
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The authors agree with those who regard 'more than ordinary' vulnerability as involving an increased risk of harm or wrongs. For individuals who are at risk in this sense, the authors propose a typology that links the different sources of vulnerability with specific obligations to address them. Specifically, the authors argue that there are three overlapping sources of vulnerability: inherent, situational, and pathogenic.
Inherent sources of vulnerability trace to the nature of human beings, including our 'corporeality, our neediness, our dependence on others, and our affective and social natures. To see this concern, consider the authors' example of a proposed (albeit never conducted) trial of sex workers in Cambodia. The authors argue that the researchers had an obligation to compensate participants for any research related injuries and should have consulted with the sex workers in a respectful way. Both of these claims are undeniable. Yet the claims that participants should be treated respectfully and compensated for research related injuries does not seem to depend on any particular conceptual analysis of vulnerability. Put differently, it is not the proposed typology that is doing the normative work here.
Rather, it is other familiar considerations in research ethics, such as minimizing risks and remedying harms caused, promoting autonomy and agency.
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The present overview has inevitably left out a number of accounts and has analyzed the included accounts in insufficient detail. It nonetheless seems sufficient to justify the claim that the literature on vulnerability in clinical research is something of 'a mess'. 35 As we have seen, the literature includes a range of accounts of vulnerability in clinical research that provide important insights and also contradict each other. It suggests that all human subjects are vulnerable, a claim that is supported by ever expanding lists of vulnerable groups. But it also suggests that vulnerability is comparative and context dependent, so that only some individuals are vulnerable and only in some cases. To try to make sense of this apparent contradiction, it will be helpful to start with a conceptual analysis of vulnerability as it is used in other contexts and consider what implications that analysis has (and doesn't have) for clinical research. health, and the future of humankind, this account suggests that the ways in which humans can be harmed are essentially endless.
| THE C ONCEPT OF VULNERABILITY
The analysis to this point highlights the practical limitations of a conceptual analysis of vulnerability for the purposes of ensuring appropriate protections in practice. First, vulnerability applies to a broad range of individuals and things. Indeed, the conclusion that X is vulnerable does not even determine whether X is a human being or a plant or a car. Second, vulnerability applies to threats and potential harms that are of significant moral concern, as well as threats and potential harms that in their own right are not morally relevant (e.g. whether a single plant in the middle of a forest develops a secondary infection). Third, there is a sense in which all human beings are vulnerable. Fourth, there are countless ways in which human beings can be harmed or wronged.
Hence, the sources of vulnerability for human beings are endless.
These conclusions illustrate why appeals to the concept of vulnerability do very little normative work in practice. In particular, they illustrate why analyses of the concept of vulnerability in clinical research are not sufficient to determine which subjects or subject groups are vulnerable. While these conclusions help to make sense of the current impasse with respect to vulnerability in clinical research, they do not seem to provide any insight into how we might resolve it. Instead, this analysis supports the claim that all human beings are vulnerable and also supports the claim that whether and how an individual is vulnerable depends on the context. Moreover, these conclusions are not peculiar to clinical research or to human beings. It seems to be the case that almost all things are vulnerable and, at the same time, whether a thing is vulnerable depends on the context. All ships are vulnerable and whether a given ship is vulnerable depends on whether it exists at a time when there are planes that can carry bombs of a sufficient size.
While this apparent contradiction has led to significant confusion in research ethics, the same result is not apparent in other fields. Despite the contradiction, readers of the history of the US navy understand the point of claims regarding the vulnerability of ships.
And botanists and winery owners understand and take effective steps to address the vulnerability of vines to phylloxera (a common tactic is to graft the vines on to American rootstock, which has evolved defenses against phylloxera). The question for present purposes, then, is how they manage this. Given that vulnerability appears to be both universal and context specific: How do stakeholders in other fields understand vulnerability and take steps to address it in practice? this makes sense, it raises competing ethical concern when the study in question offers the potential for clinical benefit. This pragmatic analysis suggests that the way to make progress on addressing the confusion around vulnerability in clinical research is to draw two distinctions. First is the distinction between categorical and comparative claims regarding vulnerability. The categorical claim 'all cars are vulnerable to theft' means that all cars can be stolen. Categorical claims take the general form of 'X is vulnerable to Y', where X is an individual or group and Y is a bad outcome (for X). These claims refer to the possibility that all the members of a group or class are vulnerable. The comparative claim that 'Hondas are vulnerable to theft' is not intended to suggest that other cars are not vulnerable to theft. Instead, these claims typically mean that 'Hondas are more vulnerable to theft than other cars.' Comparative claims take the form: X is (more) vulnerable to Y (than Z), where the comparison is often suppressed. These claims highlight the fact that some individuals or groups are more vulnerable than others.
| A PRAGMATIC ACCOUNT OF VUL NE R AB ILITY
Categorical claims regarding vulnerability can be puzzling because they frequently seem so obvious that it is not clear why one would expend the time and energy to express them. As I was thinking at the dinner party: Doesn't everyone know that all cars can be stolen? And, assuming they do, what is the point of pointing this out? How can it be helpful to state something that we all already know? This question brings us to the second distinction: the difference between the meaning and the practical significance of claims regarding vulnerability.
Comparative claims regarding vulnerability highlight the fact that protections in place for the class in general might not be sufficient for members of the cited subclass. Take the previous claim that 'Hondas are vulnerable to theft'. This claim typically means that 'Hondas are more vulnerable to theft than other cars' and thereby highlights the fact that existing background protections are not sufficient, in that context, for all members of a group. If you own a Honda, locking your doors may not be enough. You might want to consider a fancy alarm system. Clarifying the difference between categorical and comparative claims thus clarifies how it can make sense to cite specific individuals as vulnerable, even though we recognize that, in another sense, all human beings are vulnerable. These claims essentially assume that all individuals in the class are vulnerable and make the point that those in the subclass are more vulnerable (in that context). This aspect of vulnerability is reflected in the literature by views which propose that claims regarding vulnerability in clinical research refer to the fact that some individuals are more vulnerable than paradigmatic subjects. Specifically, this is true to the extent that one is considering a comparative claim regarding vulnerability.
| VUL N ER AB ILITY I N CLIN I CA L RE SEAR CH
Analyses of vulnerability in clinical research have come to two apparently contradictory conclusions. The first, supported by ever expanding lists of vulnerable groups, is that all human subjects are vulnerable.
This conclusion raises the question of what stakeholders are supposed to do in response to the claim that essentially everyone is vulnerable. The second conclusion, ostensibly inconsistent with the first, is that vulnerability in clinical research is comparative and context dependent, such that only some individuals are vulnerable and only in certain contexts.
A pragmatic analysis suggests that the way to resolve this dilemma is not to investigate what claims regarding vulnerability mean. Instead, it is to clarify the point of making them. The claim that all human beings are vulnerable makes sense to the extent that one wants to call attention to the need for societal norms, laws, and regulations to protect human beings from harm. 40 For example, it has been argued that human vulnerability points to the need to recognize that we all have special obligations to protect and assist those who are vulnerable with respect to us. 41 What then is the point of the claim that all human subjects are vulnerable? Doesn't this simply follow from the fact that all human beings are vulnerable and human subjects are human beings?
The claim that all human subjects are vulnerable, like the claim that all cars are vulnerable to theft, is a categorical claim. It means that all human subjects may be harmed. This claim makes sense to the extent that general protections for human beings may not be sufficient to protect human subjects. The presence of laws, police officers, and social norms may not be sufficient to protect research subjects. For example, the claim that all human subjects are vulnerable implies that the general right to sue those who cause harm may not be sufficient; we may need research specific protections. To consider a specific example, based on the fact that all human subjects are vulnerable, Grinnell argues that current approaches to risk assessment and compensation for research injuries need to be revised 'analogous to the way that the precautionary principle moves forward environmental action in the absence of scientific certainty.' 42 The point for present purposes is not whether one agrees with his proposal, but to note that, in a context in which one is evaluating whether existing research regulations in general are adequate, it makes sense to claim that all human subjects are vulnerable. concern that sponsors and investigators will use lower-income countries to test products and interventions that are intended for highincome countries. One proposal to address this concern is the 'fair benefits' framework. 44 This framework specifies that individuals and host communities in lower income-countries should receive a fair level of benefits, given the risks they face and the extent to which others benefit from their participation in a given trial.
A To consider a second example, most research regulations and guidelines do not place an upper limit on the net risks to which competent adults may be exposed. The US regulations mandate that risks must be minimized and the remaining risks to subjects must be 'reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, and the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result (45CFR46.111). These requirements do not preclude a study that poses high net risks to competent adults, provided the risks cannot be reduced and they are justified by the social value of the information to be gained. Thus, consider a competent adult with reduced kidney function who is at very high risk from participating in a phase 1 study of an experimental drug that is excreted by the kidneys. there are so many different possible reasons why existing protections might not be sufficient for a particular group, the attempt to develop a general and exhaustive account of vulnerable subjects inevitably leads to extensive lists.
Finally, it will not be possible in all cases to address individuals' vulnerability. While researchers should attempt to accommodate a broad range of languages, it is unrealistic to assume that even the most wellfunded study site will be able to provide interpreters for every possible language. And telephone interpreters have their limitations as well. 
| CONCLUSION
The literature on the vulnerable in clinical research appears to lead to a theoretical impasse. The conclusion that all human subjects are vulnerable seems both correct and incapacitating. What are stakeholders supposed to do in response to this conclusion? Moreover, the conclusion that everyone is vulnerable seems inconsistent with the claims that vulnerability is comparative and context-dependent. And if that is right, it will be impossible to develop a comprehensive account of vulnerability that is internally consistent. The present analysis suggests that the solution to this dilemma lies in recognizing that the practical significance of claims regarding vulnerability is not determined fully by their meaning; it depends on the context in which they are used and can thereby vary from context to context. This pragmatic analysis reveals that many of the existing accounts of vulnerability in clinical research are not inconsistent. Instead, they provide a proper understanding of different aspects of the overall topic. The claim that all subjects are vulnerable makes sense in the context of assessing whether general research regulations are appropriate.
Are protections for human beings in general, such as laws as against battery and assault and the right to sue, sufficient for ensure adequate protection of research subjects? Or are research specific protections needed? And this analysis is consistent with the claim that only some subjects are vulnerable in the context of assessing whether there are individuals for whom the general protections are not sufficient.
Finally, the present analysis suggests that we should stop asking too much of general accounts of vulnerability. The way to ensure appropriate protections for research subjects is not to undertake an analysis of the concept of vulnerability and, on that basis, attempt to develop comprehensive lists of vulnerable groups. Instead, we need to develop guidelines of which individuals and groups are vulnerable in the context of different studies and circumstances, and what steps might help to protect them in those contexts. This process involves at least seven steps.
First, we need an account of vulnerability in clinical research, with an understanding of the ways in which things can go worse for individuals -they can be harmed or wronged -as a result of their participation in research. Second, more work is needed to define the proper scope of protections for research subjects. For example, research regulations should protect subjects from being exploited by investigators.
Should they also require investigators to address existing injustices that trace to the problematic actions of others? Third, it will be important to develop general mechanisms to realize the called for protections. Clearly, independent review and informed consent are vital here.
But it does not follow that they are sufficient. We also need to determine whether research regulations should protect even consenting adults from high net risks and, if so, how should this risk limit should be defined and implemented. Fourth, it is important to identify contexts in which the general mechanisms are not adequate to ensure the appro- Conceptual analysis of vulnerability is needed to answer question one and can help with questions two and three. In contrast, no general conceptual analysis of vulnerability, including the present one, will yield answers to questions four, five, and six. These questions, which represent the primary focus of current scholarship, concern not the meaning of vulnerability, but the practical significance of claims regarding vulnerability. As we have seen, the practi- 
